

### **Political organization**

We now enter the third part of the book. The first four chapters served to map out our current situation and what we need to do. We talked about the peripheralization of capitalism, the challenges facing communists today, and the requirements for a theory that would help us advance our practical tasks. The second part of the book was devoted, first, to understanding these requirements and introducing three ideas that help us build a theory appropriate to them—the idea of the organizational point of view, modes of social organization, and their dominance. We then used these ideas to revisit our initial diagnosis of peripheralization and assess whether our theory was indeed capable of thinking from our historical moment. We thus reconsidered the *Manifesto's* analysis of the spontaneous tendencies of capitalism, discussed the role of the worker in the organization of capitalism, and offered an organizational definition of what the process of the peripheralization of capitalism would be based on the difference between the alignment and misalignment between these social logics. With this, we completed the necessary foundations for taking the next step.

We now arrive at the central dimension of this entire effort. After all, in light of everything we have discussed so far, what is a political organization? What does it mean to fight politically? We know that we need to approach struggles without assuming that they take place in a modern capitalist society, as we cannot count on the supposed organizational “shortcuts” that modern alignment would provide us. But is it possible to deal with these questions without automatically creating another ideal model of radical politics, which we would then use to compare and judge all other forms of struggle? A recurring tendency among communists is to elect their model revolution, their preferred political actors, creating a criterion for evaluating where struggles follow and where they do not follow the “common interests” of the proletariat—would it be possible to escape this? As we discussed earlier, when we listed the requirements for a theory of communist practice, what we need is a way of thinking about political struggle that is not confused with any particular movement or process and that invites us, at the same time, to investigate concretely what is

happening within different real struggles. It is only from within these concrete processes that the motivations and means for a common proletarian articulation can spring.

### *Political organization*

So far, we have not really talked about political struggles and processes. We have described organizations only in terms of three interconnected questions—how they are composed, how they interact, and what is perceptible to them—and in three modes: affinity, property, and value. With these two tools, we have already been able to investigate our social reality from an organizational point of view with great flexibility, considering the different forms of social organization that inhabit the “misaligned” terrain of peripheral capitalism. What we need now is a means of differentiating which of these varied organizations could be considered political organizations.

Let’s start with an example. A small church on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro establishes a certain frontier relationship with its members and its surroundings—sharing a common neighborhood culture—and deals with value both by offering job opportunities to its members and by charging dues—which implies a particular relationship with labor power, its reproduction, and the reproduction of the church itself—and has a relationship with the state, rights, and property that can be conflictive—if, for example, it offers a type of protection and social security that the state is unable to provide, while at the same time its accounting is not in compliance with current laws. This form of organization leads the church to interact with some things—the neighborhood, families, the economic difficulties of its followers, etc.—and not others—for example, the exchange rate of the dollar, the opening of new civil service exams, or who was elected in the United States are of little importance. If it were a branch of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, a huge international church complex in Brazil, perhaps some of these other factors would be more relevant. But because it interacts with certain organizations in its environment—the result of its particular composition—this church, as a social organization, is also sensitive to some specific variations, that is, there are specific references that make a difference to it and the people it organizes.

What interests us specifically in this example is to realize that the point of view of this organization—what it is capable of doing and what it “sees” of reality—is ultimately part of what there is to see in the already established capitalist reality. In other words, participating in the church certainly changes the reality of the people who gather there, but what this point of view makes visible to them already existed, was already accessible as a horizon, regardless of whether they organize there or not. This does not prevent a person, by organizing there, from having access to relationships and ways of thinking that they did not have before – but this change is new to the individual, it does not imply something new for the world.

A similar analysis could be made in the case of a school. Of course, through classes, students have increasing access to something they would not be able to access without going through that formative process, but this horizon was already available, as it is part of capitalist social organization: it is an education consistent with the position they will enter in the job market and with the culture expected of their social class. And this is to be expected: if the forms of organization involved in that church or school are restricted to affinity, property, and value, they will not allow us access to much more than that. We say that an organization is “social” when what it makes accessible is already part of the social world in which we live.

Now consider another church or religious association. Although it is also composed of community ties, property, and value, this organization subjects all these forms of relating to another principle—for example, it uses the Bible as a means to combat homophobia and protect women from harassment and aggression, encourages solidarity and thereby combats competition and economic precariousness among the faithful, uses the idea of the sacred to create moments when it does not matter who owns what property. This church may not consider itself political—perhaps the discourse that circulates there is explicitly antipolitical, since politicians are considered part of the problem—but by participating in this congregation, a person has access to a point of view, the result of the way this organization interacts with its environment, which does not reiterate the horizon that was already accessible to the person independent of that space. This discrepancy between what is experienced in this church and the world around it is even felt in the flesh, as it is difficult to communicate this experience to others without inviting them to participate in this

space, and any believer who tries to spread the word to their family and coworkers will feel that they are going against the grain.

The novelty in this case is not only a novelty for those who participate in the church: by participating, people are helping to create something that is in conflict with the way the social world itself is organized. This church is a political organization because it is irreducible to the social logics of affinity, property, and value, subjecting all three to other principles—and, in doing so, interacting with reality in a new way and unveiling another way of looking at social reality, where there is not only what is already established, but the possibility of greater transformations. From a distance, this church and the one from our first example would be indistinguishable, but an investigation must be able to recognize this difference—and must be able to learn something from it.

The same situation applies to the example of the school. Compare its usual functioning with what happens during a student occupation. Of course, a school occupied by students continues to be organized by relationships determined by the three social modes we have studied – but it subjects all of them to something else. Relationships of friendship and enmity are crossed by another type of commitment, revealing another type of common substrate among people. The differences between students, teachers, staff, and management also continue to exist, but at the same time they are clarified and transformed as new pacts are created and the “untamed” students start to define the boundaries of that space. The role of the school in training workers, as well as the relationship between the school's own workers and the means of production available there – all of this is also reorganized through another use of space, the kitchen, classrooms, courtyard, etc. It is a political transformation of this organization, because the perspective that unfolds from its point of view also reveals a horizon that is irreducible to the possibilities of education under capitalism. This is why this perspective is not so easily shared with those who are not engaged in this process. From the point of view of other social organizations—government, family, neighbors, police—a school occupied by other principles is indistinguishable from a disorganized school.

To describe the difference between social and political organizations, we use the idea that there is “something else” capable of restricting the scope of the three forms of social organization, placing them at the service of another principle. It is this “something” that differentiates the use of the Bible as a means of integrating the faithful into the capitalist social world from its use as a means of promoting another collective life, and it is this “something” that guides a student occupation that gives new purpose to the school space and apparatus. We have been deliberately vague about the name of this other element, but not because it is something mystical and unnameable—after all, both the faithful and the militant high school students would have much to say about their reasons and forms of action—nor because it is always the same thing—after all, a spiritual motivation may even clash with the justifications of politicized students. The need to avoid specifying too much what would guide this process of political reorganization stems from the fact that, for us, the content of this principle and form of action is itself the result of the process of political organization. In other words, this new horizon that becomes visible through a process of political organization, this new way of looking at social reality, paradoxically includes the creation of the means to name and think about what principles, norms, and ideas we are effectively following when we organize ourselves in this way. A political organization, in this sense, is also a way of reinventing what it means to engage in politics: we subject social life to other ways of doing things, often without much awareness of what we are doing, but as we organize, insist, and reorganize the reality around us, we also create a new language to describe our actions and what they allow us to see of the world. And what we learn through this process cannot be derived or decided in advance; it must be investigated concretely.

We chose a church and a school as examples, and we chose to compare them to politicized versions of the same organizations, to demonstrate that our approach does not require us to define in advance what types of organizations would, by their very nature, be political organizations, nor to be able to clearly explain what principles, ideas, and worldviews guide these political processes. We can certainly apply this type of analysis to unions, anarchist collectives, and socialist parties, but its scope and flexibility become more evident if we show that it also applies to any other form of organization, including more ephemeral processes such as popular uprisings or collective acts. As we know, this type of flexibility is crucial for communist practice in peripheral conditions.

*Where do political ideas come from?*

We define political organization as any social activity that is capable of subjecting the logics of value, property, and affinity to other collective principles. Let us call these principles, or forms, political ideas. It is worth remembering that we are still in the field of collective organization and practice and, therefore, we do not use the term “idea” to describe something abstract or conceptual: the term serves only to describe forms of organization that cannot be derived by the mere application or mixture of social logics. It is a very colloquial sense of the term: “I had an idea!” is a very common way of saying that we have found a new way to solve a problem or to do something different. When we use the term in this sense, it is not the difference between something abstract or concrete that matters, but that between a new way and an already known, routine response—an idea is, here, the opposite of an ideal plan: it sets us in motion, but without necessarily having much clarity about where we are going. A political idea, in this sense, is precisely what allows, at a given moment, an organization to submit value, property, and affinity to some other way of doing things—a different way that was not prescribed by any of these three modes of social organization and that therefore brings into play other possibilities that have not yet been explored.

That said, we must now ask ourselves: where would principles of collective organization that are not derived from value, property, or affinity come from? Are the ideas at play in different political organizations the result of a fourth “logic,” with a fixed and recognizable structure, that has not yet had a chance to become the dominant social mode?

Considering everything we said initially about the need to resume communist practices without any expectation that there would be a tendency toward spontaneous convergence between struggles, it is easy to answer this question. Even if we come to understand, one day, that all of humanity’s emancipatory political struggles were in fact only attempts to implement the same form of social organization that has been given different names throughout history, adopting this position at the moment would only lead us back to the impasses that arise from this belief in an underlying unifying revolutionary force. For us, there is much more to be gained by affirming that

there is nothing that guarantees unity among the different political forms of movements and organizations, no logic that facilitates the connection between them, and by forcing us to learn about and engage with these different political dynamics and strategies—and to deal with the problem that this poses regarding the origin of these different forms.

To address the question of the origin of political ideas, we need to return to a discussion that we have so far only touched on obliquely. When we discuss the forms of "dominance" of a given social mode—for example, value in capitalism—we distinguish three types or ways in which this domination occurs. The first two—associated with what Marx called formal and real subsumption—concern the direct reorganization of the components of social life. That is, when value dominates, it either connects things it has not organized in its own way, or it forces things to reorganize themselves to facilitate their integration into the world of commodities and capital. The third way in which a social mode exercises its domination – which we call "material domination" – works a little differently. Here, value is trying to integrate into its functioning everything that remains on the threshold of social organization, that which cannot be totally forced to reorganize itself directly according to the criteria of value. It is, therefore, a form of domination where the dominant logic needs to "propagate" through substrates it does not control. This type of organizational substrate certainly includes forms of organization of biomes, physical systems, climatic phenomena, but it can also include human organizations that are relatively indifferent to social integration, such as artistic processes, love, and other forms of creative association.

In the following chapter, discussing the fate of the worker in the periphery, we again touched on the question of what happens at this threshold between social organization and everything that is indifferent to it, since this boundary defines one of the main characteristics of work, which is to be the site of a conflict between the existing social form and the material reality on which we depend, but which remains alien to us to some extent. One dimension of this conflict is central to the definition of work and labor in capitalism, since it is up to labor, for capital, to transform this material reality according to the form of value, producing new commodities. But there is yet another dimension, with which we conclude that discussion, and which concerns the opposite path: the case when we do not transform reality to adapt it to a current social form—for example,

transforming clay into bricks that can be sold for civil construction—but when we stress this social form by adequating it to aspects of the material reality itself—such as when an artist says she learns from the properties of clay itself what a sculpture could be, forcing the artistic community to think in a new way. In this second case, we have a reversal: material reality does not give content and social organization to form, but it is the collective organization of humanity itself that is strained by another way of doing things, which emerges from elsewhere.

It is much more intuitive to link the idea of this “other place” contained in material reality, indifferent to the way we organize ourselves socially, to nature and biophysical processes. It is easy because we are accustomed to defining nature and the laws of nature as the field of everything that has its own laws that do not depend on us. It is almost a definition: society is the domain of laws that we can change, nature is the domain of laws over which we have no control. And, still staying in this more intuitive field, we can even use this case as an example of how the agroecological struggle aims to subject the organization of value, property, and affinity to the determinations of nature, recognizing the importance of political principles of reorganizing life based on the energetic limits of our planet and the threat that industrial progress poses to ourselves and other species. Even though it is useful, this more intuitive division between society and nature does not serve us, because, as we have already discussed, there are both human and non-human organizations that operate “below” the threshold of what a society can control and integrate into its functioning—just as there are also many non-human processes that capitalism has managed to integrate almost completely into its dynamics.

If we want to define a little more rigorously this intuition that new political forms and principles can emerge beyond the material dominance of a social form, it is important to be clear that by “material” we do not mean what is physical, objective, and separate from the human. It is not about what is the object of an exact science – even though much of what the sciences investigate is part of material reality. To make this clear, it is important to remember that our definition of material reality is relative, that is, it concerns everything that behaves like the matter of a given social organization in particular. Nothing is “in itself” material; things are the material of something.

One way to unravel this definition is to think that the material substrate of an organization functions as a “black box” for that particular organization: we break down and analyze the parts of that phenomenon, how things relate to each other... until we come up against something that we cannot evaluate with the same tools, a kind of threshold for those particular analytic means. We know that this something we cannot analyze is crucial to the functioning of what we want to understand, but from that point on we enter another territory, because what lies below that threshold works in a totally different way from what we have been analyzing up to that point. Think of a mechanic: he knows how to disassemble an engine, separating all the parts of the car, naming and analyzing each one—but there are processes and components that are crucial to the functioning of the car, such as thermodynamic combustion processes, the structure of the carburetor's metal alloy, and a whole reality underlying the parts and functioning of the car that, if the mechanic wants to name and analyze, he will need to stop talking about car models, engine operation, and even whether something is broken or not, because these things do not matter so much to physics. All of this makes a difference to the repair and functioning of the car, but does not immediately make a difference to the mechanic himself, operating like a black box, concealing processes that nevertheless participate in that organization. Material support is composed of all the processes and structures that operate in this way in a society: we depend on these “black boxes,” but social logic cannot completely integrate what occurs there into its own functioning.

Consider a party for rich people: drinks and appetizers circulate as if by magic, spilled drinks on the floor disappear, doors are opened and closed without the hosts' intervention... everything happens as if there were no backstage cooks, waiters, and doormen performing all these tasks. These people form a “black box” in relation to the party: the party depends on them, but they do not exist for the party—to understand what is going on with the work team, it would be necessary to consider racial domination, the sexual division of labor, the exploitation of informal labor... a whole series of issues that the party serves precisely to ignore. This set of relationships that sustain the party, but do not fit into it, forms its material support. Now consider one of these invisible workers: this person walks up and down, eats, expends energy, interacts with others—as if it were magic for their body to do all this. Physiological and metabolic processes are a black box for the worker himself: he depends on these processes, but much of the physical organization of his body and his environment

remains essentially alien and invisible to his daily work. In this sense, what we call material reality is something relative to the organization we are considering.

The material support of an organization can thus be defined as everything on which an organization depends but which exists and operates in a manner that is partially independent of the form of the organization in question. There is a certain autonomy in these processes: they are generally indifferent to what is happening in the organization that interests us—the work regime of the waiters and cleaners at the party follows a different logic than that of the elite who enjoy themselves at their expense, for example—but which, because of their own organizational characteristics, serve as a substrate, a means for the propagation and expansion of the form of the organization in question—because without the staff, the party would not happen. This certainly includes the human effort expended in the work, but it also allows us to recognize many other processes as material supports of society, depending on which organization we are evaluating. A polluted river, for example, has nothing social "in itself" – the river does not care about affinity, ownership, or value – but in a capitalist society, the pollution of the river helps to reproduce capitalist relations, since the lowest social cost to clean up the river comes from paying a company to do so, since neither the state nor the affected communities have the means to do so. Pollution reproduces capitalist organization, despite being indifferent to it, as it spreads throughout the world a problem that is now more easily solved by capitalism itself. Materiality, in this sense, is a type of relationship between the organization of society and the organization of the non-social things on which it depends.

It is crucial for us to revisit this definition, which was already at stake in previous chapters, because it is precisely from the material reality of social organizations that flashes of insight, examples, and ideas can emerge about how we can reorganize ourselves politically in a given situation. After all, what happens in the material support of an organization has power over it—because the organization depends on these processes—but does not exist for it—because it functions differently from the organization in question. Practical knowledge of work and its hardships, the needs of the soil, climate cycles, the ways of survival of those who exist in the gaps of society... all of this constitutes, at the same time, the substrate of our social reality and the source of new forms of

political organization. An emancipatory political process is an effort to transform the material reality of society into the source of new social forms, new ways of organizing collective life. But since the forms that inhabit the black boxes of social organization are not completely compatible with that organization, this process of creating, consolidating, and expanding new forms necessarily points to a profound social reorganization—and therefore requires a struggle.

And here we find some advantages of having proposed a definition of material reality from an organizational point of view. The first is that we can preserve the classic Marxist principle that forms and forces with revolutionary potential should not be sought in “ideas or principles invented or discovered by this or that world reformer,” as the *Manifesto* criticizes, but rather in what constitutes concrete reality. This is possible because, for us, the crisis of the modern figure of the worker does not mean that there is nothing left that strains or transcends the limitations of capitalism. Instead, we argue that the material reality of capitalism has also fragmented, since different social organizations will find support in different material processes. And for that, we need to recognize this “black box” relationship between social organizations and their material supports, and the forms of organization of these obscured or invisible processes.

The second advantage is that, since the organizational point of view does not treat politics as a particular type of activity, but as a dimension of any activity that can be collectively articulated by principles that break with modes of social organization, it matters little to us how these new forms present themselves in particular. It is possible for popular struggles to be articulated in terms of moral and utopian ideals and, over time, adopt a more “materialistic” revolutionary discourse—as was the case with part of the Catholic grassroots movement in Brazil in the 1960s – just as struggles may enter the scene appealing exclusively to military and economic issues of land seizure and end up reorganizing themselves according to “immaterial” principles learned from indigenous peoples and quilombolas – as has happened with other important political processes more recently. Analyzing from the point of view of the content of the principles and forms of organization, we might find that some of these principles are “idealistic” because they are conceived in spiritual or moral terms, but, according to our definition, if this spirituality is part of how black people already organize and resist in the fractures of Brazilian racist and capitalist society, if it is part of what

occurs in the shadow of the organization of society around whiteness, there is no reason to consider this origin and motivation of the struggle less "materialistic" than any call for the organization of factory workers.

But why, ultimately, would it be important not to base our struggles on far-fetched ideas, theoretical abstractions, or personal utopian visions? The reason is pragmatic and becomes more evident from an organizational point of view. When I propose something I have thought of on my own, whether it is a slogan, a suggestion on how to reorganize a process, or a new strategic objective, all the work of transforming that idea into a concrete organizational dynamic still remains to be done—nothing prevents it from being a good suggestion, but there is still a long way between what is said or thought and the existence of social relations that have that structure. When we find ways of organizing ourselves that already operate among us, and therefore have some social power, but remain restricted and invisible, the idea already exists as a form of organization, and the path is shorter to synthesize this dynamic and share it, reproduce it, or transform it into something political. Furthermore, if the material reality from which we extract new forms of organization is the material support of a large social structure, the greater the chance that other places that are also socially structured in this way will be able to access these forms as well—unlike what happens with my inventive but personal suggestion. This also explains why not every political idea coming from "outside" is equivalent to idealistic motivation: many political organizations in the world are created or guided by principles and forms of organization that they did not invent on their own, but learned from the history and accumulated experience of the movements and struggles that preceded us. If the material support of another political process is still similar to the material reality of our own form of social organization, then the ideas do not really come from somewhere else; it is our social world that is bigger than it seemed.

This way of defining the origin of forms of political organization does not imply that they arise ready-made, that they are political by their very nature, that they have any chance of spreading socially against conservative and reactionary forces, or that they are compatible with the political form of other struggles around the world. All of this depends on how this "political matter" will transform into an orientation for a reorganization of collective life, how we will be able to

experiment with these forms through struggles for composition, interaction, and perception, and, above all, whether we will be able to weave these new, specific, and localized forms into larger and more powerful articulations.

### *Emancipation, conservatism, and reactionism*

In the previous sections, we discussed what makes any organization a political force: the submission of its forms of organization to some other collective principle, extracted from the material reality of social life, and which, however, is irreducible to the current forms of organization of our world. It is by structuring themselves differently that organizations are also able to see the world differently—and "see" in a very practical sense: what makes a difference in reality is what changes. We also mention a very important characteristic of political organizations, because this additional principle is enriched and clarified by the political process itself: it is also with the unfolding of a new reality that we also find better concepts and words to name where we are going and who we are.

It turns out that this characteristic seems to be a specific aspect of emancipatory political organizations—that is, of struggles to transform reality in the name of equality and justice. It is because we seek a world that does not yet exist that we also cannot be completely clear about the principles, strategies, and ideas that guide us. Even words like "equality" and "justice" carry this nebulosity: they point to potentially new social forms—since it is not possible to have equality under affinity, property, or value—but for this very reason they cannot tell us exactly how we should act in each situation; they are not ideals or scripts that we can merely apply. We can—and must—draw on the histories of the struggles that preceded us and connect as much as possible with larger political movements, as this helps to give substance and direction to this central enigma of radical politics. But neither the study of great revolutions, battles, and traditions of struggle, nor even our own previous political experiences, can eliminate the creative dimension of revolutionary political struggle and the need to learn not only from the past, but from the effects of our actions and the actions of our comrades.

We affirm that this creative dimension is a feature of emancipatory political organization, as this problem does not arise in the same way for the two other possible political orientations, conservative and reactionary.

Being a conservative, as the name implies, means using the way the world is already organized as a guide for new actions and groupings. Conservative political organizations—which make up the vast majority of organizations in the world—rarely raise political banners and constantly appeal to what is “correct,” “fair,” and “appropriate” according to the social structure in which they are embedded. This does not mean that they do not adopt a political position, because even in situations where there would be opportunities for transformation, conservative organizations insist on repeating and reproducing existing forms of organization—they cover every social “hole,” every crisis or moment of invention, with patches made of value, property, and affinity.

It is common for conservatism to emerge as the result of a fairly reasonable bargain: it is better to resist any major transformation of reality because, by leaving things as they are, we at least know what we are dealing with and what we have to defend ourselves against. And it is worth remembering: it follows from our theory of organizational perspective that, from the point of view of conservative organizations – that is, organizations purely articulated from the prevailing social logics – any other organizational principle is indistinguishable from disorder, which only reinforces the motivation to avoid any major disruption of social life. In short, conservatism relies on a mixture of the three social logics that organize our world to promote the continuation of the social order as it is: in the case of extremely aligned and integrated social formations, it will support this form of organization; in the case of fragmented and misaligned societies, it will do its best to find its place in this other mixture—for example, trusting that it is not worth enforcing the law where it does not work, because it knows that it is still possible to get by in other ways. It is different from reactionism.

Reactionary organizations, like conservative ones, have no problem describing the principles that regulate them. Unlike conservatism, however, reactionism is guided by political principles that conflict with the three general social logics. The crucial difference is that these reactionary

principles are not beyond the current social world, but fall short of it: reactionary politics chooses a piece of the dominant social form already given as a model for its new organizations. That is why, unlike the diffuse and often difficult-to-understand principles of emancipatory organizations, reactionary organizations appeal to well-known and established ideals—more than that: they elevate small pieces of concrete reality, such as the opinions and particular traits of elites, individuals, and specific social forms, to the status of major causes. White supremacy, the protection of banks and economic austerity, the restoration of order in the streets, patriarchy, homophobia, and transphobia, etc., are all banners that neither coincide with social life in general—since society contains much more than that—nor point to the transformation of the world in the name of something new. They are emblems for organizations that would like the world to be smaller than it already is—which is why reactionism inevitably identifies parts of the world that do not fit these restrictive ideals and declares that these people and forms of organization should not exist.

It is worth noting that the presence of reactionary forces tends to create confusion between emancipation and conservatism: from the point of view of a destructive impetus, which effectively seeks social particularism, even the plea to stick to the breadth and diversity of forms of value extraction, proprietary enclosure, and community cliques seems like a passionate defense of political "universalism"! Obviously, this is nothing more than confusion, and to realize this, one need only note how the signs are reversed and alliances are broken when such a conservative appeal has to deal with the novelties that emancipatory politics brings to the fore—since, for the conservative, these novelties are indistinguishable from disorder, they suddenly begin to wonder whether a fascist order might not be preferable to the supposed revolutionary chaos...

This way of distinguishing between emancipatory, conservative, and reactionary politics does not depend on the specific content of the political emblems adopted. It is a way of analyzing that—remaining consistent with our theory of communist practice—distinguishes these political orientations from an organizational point of view and from the relationship that each of these orientations has with the material reality of society. There are struggles that subject the current social organization to other modes of action, drawn from the material basis of our world, creating a

circuit of invention and transformation of social life into something new; there are struggles that strive at all costs to patch up the material basis from already established social practices; and there are struggles that rise up against groups and ways of life that they consider "unfit" for the world, and which therefore organize themselves in the name of destroying social reality, that is, of relegating even more ways of life to invisibility. Considering this difference—between forms of political organization that aim to increase, preserve, or decrease the size of what is possible to live—it becomes easier to understand why, even if every political process implies the submission of social logics to some other principle, only emancipatory politics depends on an orientation that cannot be fully explained, described, or socially accepted—an orientation that becomes clearer as the struggle unfolds. This is why the revolutionary struggle is inseparable from the demand for self-determination of peoples and the proletariat, that is, from the political struggles that invent the world for which they are fighting.